Previous posts have discussed what I consider to be the detrimental impacts of party politics, and of what could effectively be considered as self-regulation by those in government.  The dangers of leaving such power in the hands of individuals (already in power) and who are potentially either subject to or biased by partisan political perspectives are such that the ultimate effect can be to render null all forms of oversight.

In the United States of America today, there exists the Federal Electoral Commission (FEC), a body which is responsible for monitoring elections and in particular the application of federal campaign financing law.  Briefy, the FEC should comprise six commissioners (with no more than three from any one political party) who each sit for six years.  The appointments are staggered and the position of Chair is held for one year at a a time and cannot be held by a single commissioner more than once.  Appointments are recommended by the President, and are then approved (or not) by the House and the Senate.  The rules for the commission state that there must be at least four sitting commissioners for ruling decisions to be made.

There are currently only three sitting commissioners!

There have been only three since the resignation of Commissioner Petersen in 2019 – the two other Commissioners Ravel and Goodman resigned in 2017 and 2018 respectively.  The previous two Presidents of the United States of America (Bush and Obama) both tried and failed to appoint new commissioners.  The latest appointee Trey Trainor was recommended by Donald Trump three years ago, but was finally appointed in May 2020.  One month later, the incumbent Chair Commissioner Hunter resigned.  (with the exception of Trey Trainor, the other Commissioners are serving beyond their normally mandated six-year terms.)  The net result is that the FEC still cannot enforce any potential transgressions of campaign finance law until at least one additional Commissioner is appointed.

It is not fully clear to me why it took three years to process this most recent appointment; possibly because there is a ‘unwritten rule‘ that appointments should be bi-partisan (one Republican and one Democrat at a time) – although there are also questions around the candidates suitability since Trainor has been a vocal supporter of de-regulating campaign finances for a long time.  Either way, the fact remains that the FEC is effectively unable to fulfill its role overseeing politicians because politicans have not fulfilled their role in appointing its members.

Just to add balance – this situation is not unique to the United States of America: in the UK the government refused to release an Intelligence Security Committee report before an election and then failed to re-establish the committee in the first six months following the election.

Why should it be then, that those in power have the ability to effectively determine their own oversight?  Why is it that when selecting someone for any job of oversight, we see political parties selecting ‘their own candidate’ for the position rather than the best candidate for the position?  Surely the role of oversight should be fulfilled by the person best-suited for the job – and not based on whether or not the person in question votes red or blue?

Needless to say, the vote in the US Senate to appoint Trey Trainor (who happens to be a supporter of Donald Trump) was along party lines – Republicans (49) voted For, and Democrats (43) voted Against.  This clearly illustrates to me the danger of ‘grouping’ politicians and political opinions into parties: my party becomes automatically good and your party becomes by definition wrong.  In situations such as this, the qualifications of the candidate are reduced to a single criteria: political allegiance.  The person on ‘your team’ gets the job, regardless of ability.  Under such conditions, there is no review of an individual candidate’s competencies, no evaluation of motivation or agenda – the only consideration becomes colour…  remind you of anything?

(Decision-making based on pre-set conditions such as colour – be it political colour or skin-colour – negates the influence of criteria which are relevant to the decision making process, and as has been previously discussed, that is simple discrimination.)

Hidden behind this simple ‘partisan’ approach however is a more troubling concept: that of true independence.  Regulatory bodies such as the FEC may well be touted as ‘independent’ by those subject to its rules, yet I would argue that by the very fact that the appointees themselves are selected by those subject to regulation, independence is impossible. The facade of independence cannot be maintained when those being judged appoint the judges…  am I allowed to choose the police officer investigating my own alleged crimes?  Am I permitted to choose the judge who will sit in judgement over me?

Why is it then that we permit the political class to do this?  There is an inherent self-interest in allowing politicians to choose the nature and rules of the process which elects them; it perpetuates an environment in which those politicians with access to lots of financial support will continue to vote to allow such.  Likewise those who profit from not having a working FEC may well seek to perpetuate that situation.

Our political systems, and in particular those bodies which have been created to audit our governments have a vested interest in maintaining the status quo – either by definition, or through the appointment of ‘suitable’ individuals.

This is further exacerbated by the fact that the person in the street does not have the power to change this; these systems can only be changed by governments, and governments won’t change them because governments profit by them.

Governments should have no say in evaluating/ auditing or prosecuting themselves – at all, and until this changes there cannot be any true oversight; without which democracy cannot exist.